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Robin Hood versus Piggy Bank: 
Income Redistribution in Portugal 
2006-2010 
 
Summary: The redistributive effect of the Portuguese welfare state through 
pensions, benefits and income taxes is investigated in detail over the 2006-
2010 period using disposable income as benchmark. All social and fiscal policy
instruments analysed contribute significantly to the reduction in inequality and 
poverty, with benefits other than pensions being the most cost-efficient. How-
ever, the impact of the economic crisis and austerity policies implemented from
2010 has reversed the previous trends and affected negatively the efficacy and
efficiency of all instruments. 
Key words: Income inequality, Redistribution, Tax and expenditure policy,
Portugal. 
JEL: C81, D31, H22, H55. 
 
 
 
 
Portugal is a member of Esping-Andersen’s Continental-European group of countries 
typified by “transfer-heavy and service-lean” welfare states. It is also one of the most 
unequal (and poorest) of the EU countries.  The aim of this paper is to analyse the 
redistributive character of the Portuguese welfare state over the 2006-2010 period.  
Income inequality in Portugal is one of the highest in the EU. As Carlos F. 
Rodrigues and Isabel Andrade (2014) discuss, it increased in the early nineties and 
then remained relatively unchanged until the mid noughties, when the successful im-
plementation of social policies aimed at decreasing poverty together with the contin-
uing expansion of the welfare state achieved a reduction in inequality (and poverty).  
This paper discusses the effects of three redistributive instruments - pensions, 
benefits and taxes - and how efficient they have ultimately been in reducing inequali-
ty and poverty in Portugal. It is organised as follows: Section 1 briefly reviews the 
literature on how social programs and taxes affect income distribution; Section 2 in-
troduces and applies the income accounting framework to Portuguese disposable in-
come; Section 3 analyses the redistributive effect of the above three instruments; 
Section 4 studies redistribution towards the lowest quintile; Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
1. How Social Programs and Taxes Affect Income Distribution 
 
Michael F. Förster and Peter B. Whiteford (2009) stress that the analysis of the im-
pact any welfare system has on income redistribution and inequality reduction needs 
to take into account its design features, particularly how the system is financed and  
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what relationship exists, if any, between income, contributions and entitlement. Tar-
geting and progressivity are essential parts of its design and influence the resulting 
redistribution effects on household income. Martin Werding (2003) identifies two 
main types of welfare systems: Beveridgean and Bismarckian, where the former is 
funded by general taxation and built on universal flat rate provision based on resi-
dence and need criteria, whereas the latter presumes a relationship between contribu-
tions and entitlement and therefore is funded (at least partially) by social security 
contributions. 
The welfare state concept itself has a conservative (Bismarckian) origin with 
no equalitarian aims, but “because it taxes and spends” (Gøsta Esping-Andersen and 
John Myles 2009), it assumes a redistributive character with two main components. It 
is a “piggy bank”, insuring against social risks and across the life cycle through 
pensions, unemployment, sickness, and maternity benefits, a role more associated 
with Bismarckian systems; but it also plays “Robin Hood”, taking from the wealthy 
to give to the poor, through progressive tax systems and means-tested benefits, more 
associated with Beveridgean systems. The difference between the two roles is not 
clear-cut and they co-exist. For example, the Portuguese Bismarckian pension, a 
function of contributions paid and number of years worked, is complemented first by 
a non-contributory means-tested social pension to which those aged 65+ with no oth-
er source of income are entitled, and then by the “Solidarity Supplement for the El-
derly” (CSI) if the social pension is still not enough to take the household income 
above the poverty line. Furthermore, as discussed in Nicole Attia and Valérie Béren-
ger (2009), pragmatism and welfare reform have led to a greater reliance on the mar-
ket and the attenuation of this dichotomy. However, Kosta Josifidis et al. (2011) find 
that short-term changes in social spending levels are (still) preferred to long-term 
welfare reform by quick-fix politicians. 
Finally, as Herwig Immervoll and Linda Richardson (2011) argue, the redi-
stribution effect cannot be reduced to taxes and benefits, but should also include the 
provision/usage of public services (non-cash benefits), and acknowledge their direct 
influence on households’ work and savings decisions. François Marical et al. (2006) 
estimate their redistributive effect, and conclude that Portuguese public spending in 
health reduces the Gini by 14.3%, in education by 11.4% (both well above the Conti-
nental-European group countries average), and in other public services (social hous-
ing and social care for the elderly and the very young) by 2.9%. 
Ideally, the redistributive effects of the welfare state would then be evaluated 
against a “pure” pre-welfare state benchmark, or counterfactual, as discussed in Esp-
ing-Andersen and Myles (2009). As that is manifestly impracticable, versions of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2008) “income 
accounting framework” methodology are commonly adopted as, for example, in 
Lane Kenworthy and Jonas Pontusson (2005), Förster and Whiteford (2009), Cle-
mens Fuest, Judith Niehues, and Andreas Peichl (2009), Miguel Gouveia (2011), 
Immervoll and Richardson (2011), Nuno Alves (2012), Mitja Čok, Ivica Urban, and 
Miroslav Verbič (2013), and Ive Marx and Tim Van Rie (2014) in a multi-country / 
one year analysis context. In the next section the methodology is adopted to a single 
country, Portugal, over a five year period, 2006-2010, thus focussing the analysis on  
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the initial effects of the current economic crisis on the Portuguese redistributive sys-
tem. 
 
2. Income Inequality and Redistribution in Portugal, 2006-2010 
 
The introduction of social policies targeting the high level of income inequality and 
the sustained expansion of the welfare state were successful in reducing inequality 
(and poverty) in Portugal, as demonstrated by the reduction of the Gini coefficient 
from 0.381 in 2004 to 0.337 in 2009 which is discussed in Rodrigues, Rita Pires 
Figueiras, and Vítor Junqueira (2012). This reduction is mainly explained by the 
stronger growth in the share of the lower incomes: the 1
st decile share grew at an an-
nual rate of 2.6% compared to the 0.4% average. However, the deep financial crisis, 
economic austerity and Troika agreement led to a new turning point and rise in the 
Gini to 0.342 in 2010. Figure 1 shows that the share of the two lowest deciles (and 
the 5
th) rose fairly consistently until 2009, but then either remained unchanged or fell, 
while the inverse occurred to the shares of the two highest. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. INE Statistics Portugal, EU-SILC 2007-20111. 
 
 
Figure 1  Income Deciles Shares 2006-2010 (2006=100) 
 
Simultaneously, public social expenditure grew from 9.7% of GDP in 2000 to 
12.7% in 2007 and 18% in 2010, as shown in Rodrigues and Andrade (2013), while 
rising tax rates have led to tax revenues exceeding 30% of GDP. 
The methodology adopted in this paper to analyse income redistribution is 
based on the version of the “income accounting framework” described in Figure 2. 
The main difference is the definition of a new intermediate aggregate, Market in-
come + Pensions, justified by the importance of pensions in a country with an ageing 
population. All incomes are equivalised incomes using the OECD (modified) equiva-
                                                        
1 Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) Statistics Portugal, European Union Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 2007-2011. www.ine.pt (accessed March 12, 2012). 
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lence scale and the data is from the Portuguese component of EU-SILC (all house-
holds). 
 
 
Income components
Wage and salaries
+ Self-employment income
+ Property income
+ Other private incomes
1. Market income
+ Pensions
2. Market income + Pensions
 + Other social security benefits
3. Gross income
–  Employee social security contributions
4. Gross-SSC income 
– Income taxes 
5. Household disposable income
 
Source: Adapted from OECD (2008). 
 
 
Figure 2  Modified Income Accounting Framework 
 
Market income includes wages and salaries, plus self-employment, property, 
and other private incomes. It is the closest approximation to an economy with no ex-
plicit state intervention, but excluding all other incomes leads to a large number of 
individuals and households having zero (market) income. MarketP (Market income + 
Pensions) income adds (gross) old-age pensions and survivors related benefits. It also 
includes the non-contributory social pension and “regular inter-household cash trans-
fers” (mostly alimony payments). Gross income is defined as MarketP income plus 
social security cash benefits: unemployment, housing, sickness, disability, maternity, 
and child benefits, plus the “Social Integration Income” (RSI) and CSI. Means-tested 
and universal benefits are combined, as not enough detail is available in the EU-
SILC database to discriminate between them. Further details are given in Rodrigues 
(2009) and Rodrigues and Junqueira (2012), discusses the RSI and CSI. 
Disposable income is obtained from Gross income by deducting “Social Secu-
rity Contributions” (SSC) and (direct) taxes in two stages due to their different cha-
racteristics. SSC are flat rate and compulsory to all employees and self-employed; 
their deduction gives Gross-SSC income. Income taxes are personal income tax 
(IRS) and a municipal tax on the market value of the household’s home (IMI). The 
EU-SILC database has no information on indirect taxes paid by the households, such 
as value added tax (VAT). 
Pensions and benefits affect different age cohorts, and reveal different aspects 
of the welfare state and its redistributive role. Pensions fulfil a major part of its “pig-
gy bank” role, representing 45% of the social security budget in 2010. Cash benefits 
include both “piggy bank” benefits, such as unemployment, sickness, and maternity 
benefits, and “Robin Hood” benefits, such as the means-tested child, CSI, and RSI 
benefits. 
The structure of Disposable income, the benchmark income as discussed be-
low, is given in Figure 3 and shows no substantial variation over the period. The av- 
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erage tax rate was about 14% throughout, corresponding to about 17% of the equiva-
lised disposable income. Adding SSC raises these values to 21% and 26%, respec-
tively. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. INE Statistics Portugal, EU-SILC 2007-2011. 
 
 
Figure 3  Structure of Equivalised Disposable Income, 2006-2010 
 
The drop in Market income in 2009-2010 and in Disposable income (denoted 
by the white circle) in 2010 becomes clearer in Figure 4. The real increase in trans-
fers in 2009 due to the action of the automatic stabilisers at the start of the economic 
crisis (but before the deep cuts in welfare) was enough to prevent a drop in Disposa-
ble income then, but in 2010, it was at its lowest level since 2006. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. INE Statistics Portugal, EU-SILC 2007-2011. 
 
 
Figure 4  Equivalised Disposable Income, 2006-2010 (in €/Year, 2010 Prices) 
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A more detailed analysis of Disposable income and its structure by income 
quintiles is undertaken for 2010, the latest EU-SILC data available, but also the year 
when the effects of the austerity policies become apparent. Figure 5 shows the differ-
ent income structure across the quintiles, reflecting both strong household inequality 
levels and the redistributive character of taxes and benefits. Pensions and benefits 
represent almost half of the Disposable income of the 1
st quintile and just above 40% 
of that of the 2
nd, whereas they represent between 30% and 25% of the highest three. 
Conversely, SSC and taxes represent less than 20% of the income of the three lowest 
quintiles, but 37% of the 5
th. Hence, Market income is lower than Disposable income 
in the first three quintiles, virtually equals that of the 4
th and exceeds it by just over 
10% in the 5
th. 
Nonetheless, the 1
st quintile is not dominated by pensioners, as might be ex-
pected: it is the 2
nd quintile that has the highest proportion of pensions in Disposable 
income, 29.74%, and proportion of the total number of pensioners, 25.2%. It is fol-
lowed closely by the 1
st and 5
th with 27.7% and 23.0% of total pensions, respectively, 
and each about 19% of pensioners. The Bismarckian pension system plus an explicit 
policy aim to decrease old age poverty explains this structure built on an elderly po-
verty rate below the national rate in 2010 (Rodrigues and Andrade 2013). 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. INE Statistics Portugal, EU-SILC 2011. 
 
 
Figure 5  Structure of Equivalised Disposable Income by Quintiles 2010 
 
As expected, benefits are clearly pro-poor: their proportion in Disposable in-
come falls consistently from the 1
st quintile (21.0%) to the 5
th (2.5%), but almost 
halves between the 1
st and 2
nd (11.8%). Thus, households that depend on benefits are 
highly concentrated in the 1
st quintile. The progressive character of the tax system is 
also clear: taxes represent 13.4% of the 4
th quintile income, but 27.2% of the 5
th. 
However, they are actually higher in the 1
st than the 2
nd (6.8% versus 5.7%) suggest-
ing a certain regressive character at the lower end of the distribution when ranked by  
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Disposable income. The compulsory fixed rate SSC stay rather even (8% to 10%) 
across the distribution. 
Disposable income (denoted by the white circle) inequality is more evident in 
Figure 6: the 5
th quintile average is more than 5.5 times that of the 1
st, and still almost 
twice that of the 4
th. It is also higher than MarketP income in the 1
st (1.5 times), 2
nd 
(1.4) and 3
rd (1.1) quintiles, virtually equal in the 4
th and clearly lower in the 5
th (0.9). 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. INE Statistics Portugal, EU-SILC 2011. 
 
 
Figure 6  Equivalised Disposable Income by Quintiles, 2010 (in €/Year) 
 
3. The Redistributive Effect of Pensions, Benefits, and Taxes; 
Efficiency and Efficacy 
 
The analysis of the redistributive effect (RE) of the three types of instruments fol-
lows the widely used methodology based on Kakwani’s decomposition and discussed 
in Gerlinde Verbist (2004) and Urban (2009). It compares measures of inequality 
calculated at the different stages of the income accounting framework using the dif-
ferent incomes analysed in the previous section. 
The RE of a social policy instrument is defined as the difference in a measure 
of inequality (the Gini in Table 1) calculated pre and post-instrument income. 
 
Table 1  Gini Coefficients, 2006-2010 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Gini of Market income  0.5374 0.5275 0.5303 0.5234 0.5279 
Gini of MarketP income  0.4443 0.4279 0.4266 0.4184 0.4221 
Gini of Gross income  0.4142 0.4005 0.3953 0.3791 0.3858 
Gini of Gross-SSC income  0.4125 0.3991 0.3946 0.3767 0.3845 
Gini of Disposable income 0.3691 0.3591 0.3552 0.3364 0.3424 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. INE Statistics Portugal, EU-SILC 2007-2011. 
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During the 2006-2009 period practically all Gini decreased, but this trend was 
reversed in 2010. The instrument that has the highest impact on the reduction of the 
Gini is “pensions”: its RE (defined as the difference between the Gini of Market in-
come and MarketP income) rose from 0.0931 to 0.1058. However, the RE analysis 
based on the Gini leads to the issue of vertical or re-ranking effect, first discussed in 
Anthony B. Atkinson (1980). In countries where many individuals have zero Market 
income, like Portugal; Marx, Lina Salanauskaite, and Verbist (2013)’s re-ranking 
sensitivity analysis found that this effect is particularly important. An alternative is 
ranking all equivalised incomes by a single income concept ranking throughout, thus 
making the analysis benchmarked on that concept. Like in Försters and Whiteford 
(2009) and OECD (2012), the benchmark income concept chosen here is Disposable 
income. Compared to the other accounting framework income concepts, it is the 
more sensible option, as it is the income households have to spend. Therefore, in Ta-
ble 2 it is the Concentration coefficient (CC) of all incomes ranked by Disposable 
income that is reported. The CC is calculated like the Gini except that all equivalised 
incomes are ranked by Disposable income instead of each specific one. Conversely, 
the only Gini is that of the benchmark Disposable income. 
Comparing Table 2 with Table 1, it is immediately apparent that using Dis-
posable income ranking leads to a reduction in each CC value compared to its Gini 
counterpart. For example, in 2006 the Market income Gini is 0.5374 and its CC is 
0.4537. This apparent substantial drop in inequality is solely due to the different 
rankings used, not to any change in inequality itself. 
 
Table 2   Income Concentration Coefficients and Gini, 2006-2010 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Concentration of Market income 0.4537 0.4427 0.4449 0.4344 0.4315 
Concentration of MarketP income 0.4336 0.4168 0.4158 0.4058 0.4080 
Concentration of Gross income 0.4114 0.3977 0.3923 0.3760 0.3820 
Concentration of Gross-SSC income 0.4111 0.3977 0.3931 0.3753 0.3828 
Gini of Disposable income  0.3691 0.3591 0.3552 0.3364 0.3424 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. INE Statistics Portugal, EU-SILC 2007-2011. 
 
Table 2 and Figure 7 show that all CCs, just like their Gini counterparts, gen-
erally fell during the 2006-2009 period and rose in 2010. 
A crucial part of the discussion of the RE of social policy measures has to be 
that of its efficacy and cost-efficiency. It is not enough that the welfare state lessens 
inequality, as already demonstrated. It has to be seen to be doing it in an efficient 
way, particularly in times of crisis and budget cuts. Yet, as Förster and Whiteford 
(2009) discuss, the actual design of the welfare state policies influences the results: 
“for a given amount of spending, benefits paid to those with fewer economic re-
sources will be greater under a means-tested system than under a universal benefit 
system, which in turn will provide more generous payments than an earnings-related 
system” (p. 35). As referred above, the Portuguese system relies on all three: most 
pensions are contributions-related (therefore earnings-related), some benefits are 
means-tested and others are universal. 
 
  
625  Robin Hood versus Piggy Bank: Income Redistribution in Portugal 2006-2010 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2014, 5, Special Issue, pp. 617-630
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. INE Statistics Portugal, EU-SILC 2007-2011. 
 
 
Figure 7  Income Concentration Coefficients and Disposable Income Gini, 2006-2010 
 
The efficacy of an instrument is defined as the difference between the Gini (or 
CC counterpart) before and after the introduction of that instrument, i.e. it is meas-
ured by its RE. Efficiency is defined as efficacy/size*100, where size is the average 
(instrument) amount received/paid by beneficiary/contributor. Thus, this concept of 
efficiency coincides with the absolute value of Kakwani’s progressivity index, which 
is calculated as the difference between the CC of the instrument itself and the CC (or 
Gini) of the pre-instrument income. 
While efficacy asks whether an instrument works or not in reducing inequali-
ty, its cost-efficiency measures how well it works, and therefore is inversely propor-
tional to how much it costs. The higher its value the more pro-poor the system is, as 
the poorer receive a higher share of benefits than their share of pre-benefits income 
(both ranked by Disposable income). 
 
Table 3   Efficacy and Efficiency of Benefits and Taxes, 2006-2010 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Efficacy of pensions  0.0202 0.0259 0.0291 0.0286 0.0236 
Size of pensions  0.1806 0.1785 0.1786 0.1882 0.1917 
Efficiency of pensions  0.1118 0.1451 0.1629 0.1520 0.1231 
   
Efficacy of other social benefits 0.0222 0.0191 0.0235 0.0298 0.0259 
Size of other social benefits 0.0476 0.0477 0.0459 0.0550 0.0536 
Efficiency of other social benefits 0.4664 0.4004 0.5120 0.5418 0.4832 
   
Efficacy of income taxes  0.0419 0.0386 0.0380 0.0389 0.0404 
Size of income taxes  0.1820 0.1719 0.1585 0.1564 0.1708 
Efficiency of income taxes 0.2302 0.2245 0.2397 0.2487 0.2365 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. INE Statistics Portugal, EU-SILC 2007-2011. 
 
The efficacy of pensions and benefits is comparable in Table 3, rising between 
2007 and 2009 and falling in 2010, but taxes have the highest (mostly unchanged) 
efficacy by far. Benefits are clearly the most cost-efficient instrument, with pensions  
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the least one. The cost-efficiency of all instruments rose up to 2009 and fell noticea-
bly in 2010. SSC are not included because their effect on inequality is close to zero. 
The efficiency of pensions grew up to 2008 (with little change in size), but in 
2010 a simultaneous drop in their efficacy and rise in size lead to a large cut in their 
efficiency and progressivity. The efficacy of benefits (comparable to pensions, but 
achieved at a much lower cost) is reflected in much higher efficiency and progressiv-
ity. As discussed above, one explanation for this result is that many benefits are 
means-tested, whereas pensions are mostly Bismarckian. It is also consistent with 
Rodrigues (2009) result that the CSI and RSI jointly reduced the Gini by about 3% in 
2003. Another factor is the “automatic stabilisers” character of benefits at the start of 
the crisis: their size grew considerably in 2009 and carried into 2010, but there was a 
drop in their cost-efficiency.  Finally, taxes kept their efficacy even as they fell in 
size until 2009, and thus increased their efficiency and progressivity. However, it is 
important to note that it was only in 2012/2013 that the most substantial austerity led 
alterations to the tax system were implemented. Nevertheless, the redistributive abili-
ty of the fiscal system is hampered by serious limitations: Rodrigues, Figueiras, and 
Junqueira (2012) estimate that only 75% of the Portuguese households pay income 
taxes. 
Figure 8 summarises the effects of all three instruments in reducing inequality 
measured by the Disposable income Gini. Taxes are consistently the highest contri-
butor, while pensions and benefits alternate in 2
nd place, but the impact of all three 
fell in 2010. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. INE Statistics Portugal, EU-SILC 2007-2011. 
 
 
Figure 8  Summary of the Effects of Pensions, Benefits, and Taxes in Reducing Inequality 
 
4. Redistribution towards the Lowest Quintile 
 
A distinct way of analysing redistribution, and particularly targeting, is through the 
monitoring of net public transfers to each quintile of the Disposable income distribu-
tion, as reported in Table 4 for 2010. As public transfers include pensions, the 5
th 
quintile share is about twice that of the 4
th and thrice that of the 1
st, with the share of 
the 2
nd also high. The share of taxes is much more unequal: the 5
th quintile pays al- 
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most 60% of the total, nearly six times what the 1
st and 2
nd pay together. The column 
of net transfers reveals that all but the 5
th quintile receive more than they pay, in close 
to decreasing order. The exception / reversal is between the 1
st and 2
nd quintiles due 
to already discussed concentration of pensioners in the latter. 
 
Table 4  Net Transfers to Quintiles, 2010 
 
 1 st quintile 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4rd quintile 5th quintile 
Share of public transfers paid to 12.2 17.1 16.3 18.3 36.2 
(Share of pensions paid to) (9.0) (15.8) (14.8) (18.2) (42.2) 
Transfers to  3.6 5.1 4.8 5.4 10.8 
Share of taxes paid by  4.4 6.2 11.1 19.3 59.1 
Taxes from  1.2 1.6 2.9 5.1 15.6 
Net transfers to  2.5 3.4 1.9 0.3 -4.8 
 
Notes: The share of each quintile (rows 1, 2 and 4) is calculated as a % of total transfers/taxes (each row adds to 100). 
Rows 3, 4 and 5 are calculated as % of the total equivalised Disposable income. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. INE Statistics Portugal, EU-SILC 2011.  
 
Table 5 shows that net transfers to the 1
st quintile have remained relatively un-
changed throughout the period, with peaks in 2006 and 2009 and a drop in 2010. 
Most significant is the steady increase in taxes paid by the lowest quintile. 
 
Table 5   Net Transfers to 1
st Quintile, 2006-2010 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Share of public transfers paid to 13.0 12.3 13.3 13.4 12.2 
Transfers to  3.6 3.4 3.6 3.9 3.6 
Share of taxes paid by  3.1 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.4 
Taxes from  0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 
Net transfers to  2.8 2.4 2.6 2.9 2.5 
 
Notes: As for Table 4. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. INE Statistics Portugal, EU-SILC 2007-2011.  
 
Finally, the impact of social transfers to the lowest quintiles can be further 
judged through their contribution to the (reduction in) the poverty rate. For the same 
poverty line (60% of the median of the equivalised Disposable income) it is possible 
to calculate what the poverty rate would be if pensions and benefits (net of taxes) did 
not exist. Table 6 reports the difference between this value and the “official” poverty 
rate in this period. 
 
Table 6   Poverty Rate Reduction through Cash Transfers (in Percentage Points) 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Poverty incidence reduction:  
   - through pensions  16.2 17.2 17.6 17.9 17.8 
   - through other social benefits  6.2 6.3 6.5 8.5 6.7 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. INE Statistics Portugal, EU-SILC 2007-2011. 
 
Pensions contribute much more than benefits, fitting in a country with an old-
age dependency ratio above 28% and their effect carried into 2010 unchanged. How-
ever, the crisis is evident: in 2009 the action of the benefits automatic stabilisers 
helped households that were experiencing financial difficulties, but as budget cuts  
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were imposed and benefits cut in 2010, their action was curtailed and their role in 
reducing poverty was reduced itself. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper shows that the decrease in inequality in Portugal in 2006-2009 was 
achieved by an increase in social transfers, but foremost by their improved RE. Fur-
thermore, the “piggy bank” function of the welfare system dominated its “Robin 
Hood” role, although the RE of the latter had lower efficacy and cost-efficiency 
throughout the period. 
Pensions correspond to about 20% of disposable income, but have a lower 
level of cost-efficiency since they are mostly Bismarckian. Yet, they have an impor-
tant redistributive role, alter the deep market income inequality, cut the poverty rate 
by about 17 percentage points, while a significant proportion (42%) goes to the high-
est quintile of the income distribution. Benefits correspond to only 5% of disposable 
income, but being largely means-tested they are the most cost-efficient and their RE 
and contribution to poverty reduction improved over this period. The average (direct) 
tax rate fell slightly in 2006-2009, which implied both a small drop in the efficacy of 
taxes and a small rise in their efficiency. 
The results for 2010 reveal the 1
st effects of the austerity policies: a fall in the 
efficiency of all redistributive instruments, less efficacy of social transfers, a reversal 
in the previous trends of inequality and poverty reduction, whilst the policy measures 
implemented in 2012-2013, particularly the changes in the pensions contributive 
scheme and in the means-tested benefits, point to their accentuation. An effective 
reform of the redistributive role of the state that will enable a reduction in inequality, 
poverty and social exclusion even in a time of economic crisis has to incorporate an 
increase in the efficacy and cost-efficiency of its redistributive instruments. A widen-
ing of the fiscal base and progressivity of the fiscal system supplemented by firmer 
tackling of tax evasion, together with increasingly means-tested social benefits with 
more rigorous assessment and entitlement of recipients, i.e. the intensification of the 
“Robin Hood” role of the welfare state, has to be an integral part of its successful 
reform. 
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